Introduction
Data is an increasingly contested term and concept in qualitative research. Many recent contributions argue that data can no longer be treated as discrete, inert and interpretable, but rather must be understood as an emergent and relational manifestation of research activity, mutually constituted by researchers and participants acting in particular material circumstances (e.g. St. Pierre, Jackson and Mazzei 2016; Koro-Ljungberg, MacLure and Ulmer 2018) . Equally however, the definition and use of data is also changing in social policy development and public service management. Data is now as much associated with the processes and procedures of systemic accountability and 'governing at a distance' (Lemke 2012, Rose and Miller 2008) as it is with the pursuit of supposedly objective evidence to inform the development and evaluation of policy. Data now actively manages and drives policy and practice by recursively impacting on the behaviours of social actors in situ. This move transcends policy fields but can be particularly observed in health, social care and education as governments seek to manage public services by setting targets for service delivery and render the individuals within them responsible for meeting the targets. This paper will explore these parallel and apparently independent developments and argue that, while deriving from different fields and aspirations, these developments have elements in common and data is a term now as much applied to and used in political governance, as it is in (what used to be seen as) disinterested science.
Definitions and conceptualisations of data in the natural and social sciences
The term 'data' derives from Latin -'something given' or 'having been given' (from dare, to give) -implying that it can indeed be given, that it is external to the observer or knower, tangible and transferable. It is associated with observations and experiments in the natural sciences and continues to carry the implications and resonance of science for activity in the social sciences, including qualitative research. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines data as "Related items of (chiefly numerical) information considered collectively, typically obtained by scientific work and used for reference, analysis, or calculation". (It further notes, for pedants, that in this definition it is "a mass noun" and can take a singular verb.) The OED goes on to elucidate various compound words and uses including data analysis, data handling, data mining, databank, and so on. Thus, classically, data is inert, passive, 'out there', waiting to be discovered and collected, pre-existing and separate from the scientist who collects it. Moreover, data is not just collected, but categorised in various ways, so that analysis can aggregate and compare 'like-with-like'. Similarly, when variables are manipulated in experimental situations, data are, in effect, created, but are still regarded as being a property of the interaction of variables, external to the observer. The experimenter changes the independent variable to produce data pertaining to the dependent or outcome variable in question.
A similar set of assumptions seem to operate in much social scientific and qualitative research.
Qualitative methods such as structured observation and even participant observation attempt to collect what we might term 'naturally occurring' data in situ. The implication and the assumption seems to be that the researcher can directly observe events without significantly interfering or intervening in them. Interviewing, focus groups and so forth try to elicit (create) data more specifically by directly interrogating participants. Clearly this involves intervening in social situations and setting up particular encounters, but still the assumption seems to be that this can be done without distorting the data collected in important ways. The texts produced -observational field notes and interview transcripts -are then regarded as the 'raw data' for conceptual categorisation (coding), aggregation and analysis. There is of course extensive discussion in qualitative research about the extent to which this can be done without interfering with and/or biasing the 'findings' of the research. However, with appropriate practices and protocols (immersion in the field, interview schedules, triangulation of data sources and methods, member checks, etc.) it has long been argued that qualitative data can be collected, and that findings which are relatively independent of the researcher can be produced (Denzin 1970 , Hammersley and Atkinson 1983 , Miles and Huberman 1994 . Furthermore with developments in digital technology and pressure for research to deliver better value-for-money and build knowledge across individual studies, archiving data, including qualitative data, is now becoming commonplace. This implies that qualitative data can be treated as an object, removed from the circumstances of its production, and aggregated and analysed across contexts and over time. Such developments are not without critical discussion; as Flick (2015) Stenhouse 1978 , Stake 1995 , yet seem to be regularly eclipsed in the recurring 'paradigm wars' of social policy development. Social science has first and foremost appealed to the processes and practices of 'science' for its legitimacy, rather than those of history or the criminal justice system.
A static and linear model of research, policy and practice A further problem with 'conventional humanist qualitative methodology' is its acceptance, along with social science research more generally, of a linear model of research and the implication that the production of knowledge (research) can and should precede action (i.e. policy and practice).
Many philosophical issues are begged by whether or not we can observe data, isolate variables, identify cause and effect in social action, and so forth. They have been reviewed extensively elsewhere and I will not cover similar ground now (e.g. Howe 2004 , Maxwell 2012 , Morgan 2014 .
However a key empirical problem with assuming that research must precede the improvement of policy and practice, and in particular with the 'what works' call for scientifically-based evidence, is that the linear model which it invokes, of problem identification, intervention, evaluation and application/dissemination, takes too long and, ironically, just doesn't work. The 'what works' movement seems to believe that the social world is essentially static, that it can be treated as somehow 'standing still', waiting for a solution to a problem to be found and implemented. The assumption seems to be that a particular issue can be identified as a topic of policy concern and solutions pursued in a relatively straightforward manner.
Take the issue of raising educational standards, for example, which is then broken down into ostensibly interrelated constituent parts, with a series of causal links or 'mechanisms' being posited and pursued: the underachievement of poor inner city children, the importance of early reading, the development of intervention programs to promote early reading in target groups. Curriculum materials and teaching strategies are developed, interventions are designed and evaluated. Thus a multitude of intervening and interacting variables are identified and addressed. If appropriately developed and effectively taught such interventions may make a positive difference for some children. Often, of course, they do not; often there is 'no significant difference' found between intervention and control groups (Viadero 2009 ). But even successful interventions do not and cannot make a difference to all children in the target population -even positive results are only reported at the level of statistical probability, not individual certainty.
Meanwhile large scale replication and dissemination is difficult, demands additional and/or redirection of existing resources, and often creates as many problems as it solves. California's attempt to implement smaller class sizes off the back of the apparent success of the Tennessee "STAR" evaluation illustrates many of these problems. The Tennessee experiment worked with a sample of schools, whereas California attempted statewide implementation, creating more problems than they solved by creating teacher shortages, especially in poorer neighborhoods in the state. There simply weren't enough well-qualified teachers available to reduce class size statewide, and those that were tended to move to schools in richer neighborhoods when more jobs in such schools became available (see Grissmer, Subotnik, & Orland, 2009 ). A much more open, dynamic and iterative model of social action is needed in order to explore the ways in which research might make a positive but not necessarily predictable or pre-determined difference to social problems . Such a model would investigate and explore options in action, without assuming that a particular or single best solution must exist, or that such a solution will not interact with the changing nature of the problem in unpredictable ways. On the face of it, qualitative approaches to research ought to be able to encompass and generate such a model, since social interaction is the core of a qualitative approach to research and the basis for the development of qualitative methods. But the issue of a linear and chronological approach to the relationship of research, policy and practice is not simply a product of the 'what works' movement. Social research more generally has experienced similar disappointments. Successive generations of social and educational researchers, including qualitative researchers, too often discover and rediscover social issues and problems rather than contribute to solving them. A significant illustration might be the cumulative work of researchers such as Hargreaves (1967) , P. Jackson (1971) , Willis (1979 ), McNeil (1986 , McLaren (1989) , Delpit (1995), and Lipman (2004) , on the social organization of schooling and its impact on disadvantaged groups of students. These studies are exemplars of the very best of their kind, and constitute a formidable body of knowledge about the ways in which schooling privileges particular manifestations of middle class culture and behaviour. The studies demonstrate how schooling contributes to the reproduction of social inequality, often despite the best intentions of teachers, administrators, and, sometimes, the researchers themselves as they have sought to feedback findings to promote change. However, while this and similar research has produced understanding and has documented the nature of the problem in terms of empirical evidence and the production of theoretical and analytic insight, it has not produced significant and lasting change I will return to these arguments below. The point which I want to make for the moment however, is that these critiques of the concept and use of the term 'data' in social research relate to philosophical and methodological arguments within the research community. They are largely internal debates prompted, perhaps, by some of the engagements of qualitative inquiry with the demands of policy, and disillusionment with lack of educational and social change, but they are largely internal to the field none-the-less. The argument is about the philosophical basis and direction of social research, particularly qualitative research, and what theories and activities qualitative inquiry might encompass in the future. However, similar or, at least, parallel and somewhat comparable changes can also be identified in the field of policy and governance and it is to this that I now turn.
The conceptualisation and use of data in neo-liberal governance
The definition and utility of 'data' is also beginning to morph and develop in the field of social policy and public service management. Data is now as much associated with the processes and procedures of accountability and 'governing at a distance' (Foucault 2009 "We're totally data driven...We'll be punished if we have poor data so obviously it's a huge pressure to get the data looking good...it has really influenced thinking..."; "It's all based on data...the data is driving the pedagogy..."; "We have constant meetings looking at the data...you gotta play the game. If you're being judged on a score -teach to it -you're a fool if you don't. You must teach to the test" However, to link back to the production and role of data in neo-liberal governance, might not the individual responsibilisation of teachers, students, health care workers and the like, in their quest to "get the data looking good" be one example of such a "network of mutual determinations"? Isn't this exactly how neo-liberalism insinuates itself into every aspect of our professional and personal lives? It seems as if neo-liberalism already operates with a much more sophisticated theory of change than empirical social science. Change has occurred in public institutions (and indeed in commercial organisations as well) in precisely this "immanent" incremental fashion -with "practicebased accretions" slowly 'bringing the frog to the boil' so to speak, so that almost without noticing it, everything has changed. Lather (2016a) actually makes almost exactly the same interpretive point but draws different conclusions, seeing the slow accretions of neo-liberal accountability as evidence of their fragility:
How everyday material practices assemble and align with objects, ideas and behaviours involved in "new governing behaviours" particularly the over-reliance on "flows of data" as "calculating devices"...illustrate the precarity of what looks so solid and immutable (p.4).
Well, certainly, neo-liberal "governing behaviours" are assembled and invoked in and through everyday practice, they are indeed neither "solid" nor "immutable", but they feel as if they are. This surely exemplifies the power of neo-liberalism and the paradox of current theoretical thinking. Data are certainly not 'out there', waiting to be discovered. They are not inert, passive, manipulable .
They are indeed created through, in and by our activity. But by this very process, in neo-liberal accountability, they exercise as much "interpretive dominion" over us, as we do over them. They govern us, we do not govern them. Data, researcher, institution and social actor are indeed entangled -but not in a good way! Lather (2016a) also wonders about whether or not the turn to a more relational ontology, to "something not containable, in excess of meaning" (p. 1) might produce an "incalculable subject...as a counter to neo-liberal and Big Data efforts to count and parse, capture and model our every move, a subject outside the parameters of the algorithms" (p. 2). But again, does this not invoke the same theoretical paradox? If we are entangled with data, implicated in both its production and use, we cannot stand outside of the process. We produce neo-liberal data and governance even as we feel that it produces us.
Possibilities for 'the new'
In a separate but related article, Lather (2016b) reviews and reflects on the new approaches to the role and use of number and quantification in social research, as noted above (de Freitas et. al. 2016 ).
She reports "how 'datafication' produces new governmentalities by way of new intensifications and embodiments" (p. 502). But she also notes that different understandings of the role and nature of quantification as produced-in-situ (as part of an assemblage) rather than given (data), might lead to fruitful possibilities for a rapprochement "across qualitative and quantitative social science then such an emergent assemblage will only ever be able to reproduce the present (albeit with greater and greater intensity) rather than create something new.
It is here however, in these possibilities, that we can perhaps find some opportunities for conducting research, and particularly qualitative research, differently. If we think of research, and again, particularly qualitative research, as a form of co-constructed intervention in social action, rather than a static and linear gathering of information to produce findings, we may have more purchase on the activities that we seek to understand and change. Many conceptualisations of research activity already argue that the major social, economic and environmental problems that we face demand collaborative, cross-institutional and trans-disciplinary research teams to address 'global challenges' (RCUK 2017 , WUN 2017 . Such calls still invoke the power of 'expert knowledge' but nevertheless acknowledge that bringing together new configurations of disciplines and people may be able to produce new perspectives and potential solutions. In parallel with such large scale policy calls there are also more ethical and epistemological arguments for involving research subjects directly in the research activities that seek to study and supposedly improve their lives (e.g. (Hargreaves 1999) . Each of these various approaches to research understands that research is an iterative and cyclical process, but perhaps still interprets that cyclicality in terms of forward movement and pragmatic, interactive engagement with the objects of 'the real', rather than emergence, indeterminancy and the intra-active production of 'the new' in situ. To return to Lather's (2016a) reflections on the development of a more relational ontology, it is not that we necessarily will produce something new, but that the prospect at least exists if we conceptualise research as a process of constant possibility rather than something which we can drive in particular directions. Equally however it becomes clear that any claims for research must become more modest, and take their place in the larger assemblage. Data, once released from the Pandora's Box of inertia and passivity, will not necessarily prove benign in its effects. The "incalculable subject" is currently very busy trying to calibrate itself. Even governments, pursuing better national positions in international league tables, and coming under pressure if a nation appears to perform worse than previously, end up being as much subject to data as in control of it. Having said this however, it is apparent that entanglement and emergence are indeed "not containable, in excess of meaning" and as such at least provide the possibility of producing something new and, as yet, unforeseen.
